This paper presents an application-layer attack detection method based on hidden semi-markov models. In this method, the keywords of an application-layer protocol and their inter-arrival times are used as the observations, a hidden semi-markov model is used to describe the application-layer behaviors of a normal user who is using some application-layer protocol. This method is also based anomaly detection. In theory, application-layer anomaly detection can identify the known, unknown and novel attacks happened on application-layer. The experimental results show that this method can identify several application-layer attacks, and has high detection accuracy and low false positive ratio.
Introduction
Nowadays, application-layer security issues are becoming the most important issues in the network security. Observed from the network-layer, these attacks may not contain malicious activity, and they don't always generate abnormal network traffic. However, most of the existing intrusion detection techniques detect attacks only from the network-layer. So these techniques can't identify the application-layer attacks effectively. Although some signature-based approaches can identify some application-layer attacks, such as some anti-virus techniques can identify some application-layer attacks, these techniques detect application-layer attacks only from the characteristics of the application-layer attacks. So these techniques can only identify some known application-layer attacks.
However, with the development of network techniques, network-based attacks also change as follows. First, network-based attacks are easier to generate. With the help of some semi-automatic tools on the Internet, people can launch network-based attacks easily. Second, attacks' transmission speed becomes faster and faster. Finally, the attackers upgrade their existing attacks, so the mutations of known attacks are becoming more and more. These led to the unknown attacks rise, and make the potential impact of unknown attacks rise. In theory, application-layer anomaly detection methods should be able to identify any attack happened on the application-layer, including the novel attacks and the "zero-day" attacks [1] . The signature-based approaches can do nothing about this, since no signature or fingerprint is known at the time when a new attack is released. Usually, people need to have some time to identify an attack or virus after it is found for the first time, in order to be able to add the signature to the database. During this window of time, a lot of machines may be compromised.
In this paper, we use hidden semi-markov models [2, 3] to describe normal users' application-layer behaviors. A hidden semi-markov model (HSMM) is a statistical model with the same structure as a hidden Markov model [3] except that the unobservable process is semi-markov rather than Markov. statistical model based on these fields. However, this method can't identify other application-layer attacks, such as Mailbomb attack.
Existing application-layer detection methods, which can identify a variety of attacks, can be roughly divided into two types. One is based on the byte statistical distribution of payload, such as PAYL (Payload-based Anomaly Detection) method [6] and McPAD (Multiple Classifier Payload -based Anomaly Detector) method [7] . The other is based on the payload's keywords, such as ALAD (Application Level Anomaly Detection) method [8] . PAYL method extracts 256 features from the payload. Each feature represents the occurrence frequency in the payload of one of the 256 possible byte values. A simple model of normal traffic is then constructed by computing the average and standard deviation of each feature. A payload is considered anomalous if a simplified Mahalanobis distance between the payload under test and the model of normal traffic exceeds a predetermined threshold. ALAD method uses "keywords" in the payload for application-layer attack detection. For any packet, the first word of each line will be extracted as a keyword.
However, the above methods all pay great attention to the payload. They detect application-layer attacks, based on a single application-layer packet. They don't consider the same connection (TCP connection). They also don't consider the same session between the data packets' contact. However, many application-layer attacks only can be identified from the connection or the session, such as application-layer distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks [9] . Nowadays, many application-layer attacks involve multiple steps and each single step is valid, such as installing a program first and then executing it at a later time. So the above methods can't identify such application-layer attacks effectively.
Application-layer Attack Detection Based on Hidden Semi-markov Models
While normal users are using some application on the Internet, their behaviors' statistical characteristics will have some similarities. For example, while normal users are using the Web application, the speed of users' click, the process and time of browsing will have a certain similarities. Therefore, we can take these characteristics as the profile of normal users. The behaviors of abnormal users will deviate from the profile. For example, while a bot is launching a HTTP request flood attack, then its page requests are much higher than the normal users' frequency. In addition, a bot's page requests usually are generated randomly or by repeating a few simple HTTP requests, such as the home page requests, the requests for high-frequency access objects. So the request sequence of a bot will be different from normal users' request sequences.
Observed from the application-layer protocols, while a user is using some application-layer protocol, his/her behaviors can be considered as a series of application-layer protocol's keywords. An application-layer protocol's keywords are the keywords which can reflect one user's application-layer behaviors. For example, while a user is using the HTTP protocol, then this series of keywords is: 'GET', 'POST', 'HAED', and response codes '100', '200', '304', '404', etc. Therefore, we can take the application-layer protocols' keywords sequences as observation sequences, in order to describe a user's application-layer behaviors.
While a normal user is using some application-layer protocol, his/her behaviors will change. This will make the statistical distribution of protocol's keywords to be different. For example, while a user is using the HTTP protocol, when he/she is browsing the web, watching a movie, shopping respectively, then the frequency of each keyword and inter-arrival times are not the same. The different behaviors of a normal user can be considered as the different states. The state transition process can be considered as a Markov process, namely the current state is only determined by the previous one. However, the states can't be observed directly, so this is a hidden Markov process. For example, given the HTTP protocol's keywords 'GET' and '200', we can't determine a normal user's current state directly. In addition, considering the network load, the interval between two consecutive state transitions may be a complex statistical distribution, so a normal user's behaviors should be 924
Information Technology Applications in Industry III described by a hidden semi-markov model. While a normal user is using different protocols, then the parameters of model will be different. While a normal user is using some application-layer protocol, we assume his/her behaviors have M discrete states, namely s 1 , s 2 ,...,s M . Based on our experience, the value of the M usually is from 4 to 10. Let A stand for the state transition probability matrix, A={a ij },1≤i,j≤M, a ij means the probability from state s i to state s j . Assuming the protocol has K keywords, which can be expressed as: word 1 , word 2 , ..., word K , and denoted as: 1,2, ...,K. Let P stand for the state duration probability matrix, P={p i (d)}, 1≤d≤D, D is the maximum possible interval between state transitions. Let π π π π stand for the initial probability matrix, π π π π={π i }, 1≤i≤M.
Let y t stand for the observation at t from a gateway, y t =(w t ,r t ), w t ∈(1,2,...,K), r t ∈(0,1,2,3,...), where w t means the keyword at t, r t means inter-arrival time between w t and w t-1 . In this paper, one second is the time unit of r t . We assume the inter-arrival time r t and the keyword w t are independent. While a user is using the HTTP protocol, the state transition process is shown in Fig. 1 . 
In (5), if w t
(i) can be found in [10] . Detecting Phase. After obtaining the parameters of the HSMM, we can use the HSMM to check whether the observation sequences from a user is similar to most of the normal users by calculating their likelihoods. The likelihood of an observation sequence against given model indicates the probability of the observation sequence generated from the given model. In this paper, we use the average log likelihood, denoted as E. Given the observation sequence y T 1 , the average log likelihood of this sequence can be calculated as follows: In detecting phase, if a user is using such application-layer protocol, then we calculate the average log likelihood of the user's observation sequence. After that, we calculate the observation sequence's risk value, denoted as ε.
Based on the distribution of training sequences' risk values, we can define the threshold of ε. If the risk value of a user's observation sequence exceeds a predetermined threshold, the user will be considered as potential application-layer attacker that should be controlled.
Experiment
Our experiment is based on the DARPA'99 intrusion detection dataset [11] . This dataset was collected at MIT Lincoln Labs to evaluate intrusion detection systems [12] . In this dataset, all the network traffic including the entire payload of each packet was recorded in tcpdump format and provided for evaluation. We choose HTTP protocol and FTP protocol to evaluate our method. In the HTTP protocol's test, we choose 'GET', 'User-Agent', 'HEAD', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'TRACE', and 41 response codes of the HTTP/1.1(i.e. 1xx, 2xx, 3xx, 4xx, 5xx) as the HTTP protocol's keywords. In the FTP protocol's test, we choose 'DELE', 'HELP', 'LIST', 'NOOP', 'PASS', 'PORT', 'CWD', 'QUIT', 'REST', 'RETR', 'SITE', 'SMNT', 'STOU', 'STRU', 'NLST', 'RNTO', 'RNFR', 'SYST', 'TYPE', 'USER', and 39 common response codes as the FTP protocol's keywords. We obtained two different parameter sets of the HSMM using HTTP and FTP attack-free data respectively, then evaluated our detectors. In the training phase, we choose 8 as the number of states in the model. In the test data of the DARPA'99 intrusion detection dataset, there are some application-layer attacks, such as Apache2 attack, Back attack, Guessftp attack and Ftpwrite attack. The Apache2 attack and Back attack are based on HTTP protocol. The Guessftp attack and Ftpwrite attack are based on FTP protocol.
In the HTTP protocol's test, we first calculate the risk values of training sequences, then calculate the risk values of the attacks' observation sequences. The histogram of observation sequences' risk values is shown in Fig. 2 . In the HTTP protocol's test, our method's detection ratio(DR) and false positive ratio(FPR) are shown in Fig. 3 . If we take 2.04 as the threshold, the detection ratio for Back attack is 100%, the detection ratio for Apache2 attack is 99.6%, and the false positive ratio is 0.9%.
In the FTP protocol's test, we also first calculate the risk values of training sequences, then calculate the risk values of the attacks' observation sequences. The histogram of observation sequences' risk values is shown in Fig. 4 . In this test, our method's detection ratio and false positive ratio are shown in Fig. 5 . 
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If we take 2.79 as the threshold, then the detection ratio for Guessftp attack and Ftpwrite attack is 100%, and the false positive ratio is 0.8%. From the above experiment, we can see that our method has high detection rate and low false positive rate.
Conclusions
In this paper, we present a method to identify application-layer attacks. We use a hidden semi-markov model to describe a normal user's application-layer behaviors, while he/she is using some application-layer protocol. In the detecting phase, we first calculate every observation sequence's average log likelihood against the model, then calculate every observation sequence's risk value. Based on the risk value, we can identify potential application-layer attackers. The experiment results show that our method works well.
